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Case No. 20150597-CA 
INTHE 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/ Appellee, 
V. 
MICHAEL JOHN EDGAR, 
Defendant/ Appellant. 
Brief of Appellee 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Defendant appeals from convictions for possession of a controlled 
substance, a second degree felony; possession of drug paraphernalia, a class 
A misdemeanor; and unlawful possession of a dangerous weapon, a class A 
misdemeanor. This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-
103(2)(e) (West Supp. 2012). 
INTRODUCTION 
During a routine traffic stop, Officer Sager noticed that Defendant 
displayed signs of drug intoxication. Officer Sager called for both a DUI 
investigation officer and a canine officer to respond. The DUI officer 
responded first. While the DUI officer was performing field sobriety tests 
on Defendant, the canine officer arrived, and his dog alerted on Defendant's 
car. Police then searched the car and discovered methamphetamine, drug 
paraphernalia, and an axe. The time between the initial stop and the canine 
sniff was about 25 minutes. 
Defendant argues that his trial counsel was ineffective for not moving 
to suppress the evidence found in the car. Although Defendant concedes 
that officers had reasonable suspicion that he was drug-impaired, he 
contends that the officers impermissibly prolonged their investigations to 
allow the canine unit to arrive. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE 
Has Defendant shown that defense counsel was constitutionally 
required to move to suppress the evidence seized from the car? 
' Standard of Review: "An ineffective assistance of counsel clailn raised 
for the first tilne on an appeal presents a question of law. " State v. Clark, 
2004 UT 25, ,I 6, 89 P. 3d 162. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
U.S. Const. amend. IV: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, 
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported 
by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, 
and the persons or things to be seized. 
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~I 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE1 
A. Summary of facts. 
Officer Sager, a six-year-veteran police officer with advanced 
roadside impairment detection h·aining, was on patrol when he saw a Buick 
with Oregon license plates drift into another lane of traffic without 
signaling. R276:121-122,125, 160; SE4:19:35.2 Based on the traffic violation, 
Officer Sager tried to pull over the car, but the Buick did not stop 
immediately. R4. Rather, the Buick continued driving for about a minute 
and made a right hand turn, before coming to a jerky stop 100 feet from a 
church. Id.; R276:159. It was 7:35 p.111. and was almost dark outside. 
R276:125; SE4. 
Upon approaching the Buick, Officer Sager found two occupants-
Defendant, who was driving the car, and a front seat passenger. R276:126-
127. When asked about his driving pattern, Defendant explained that he 
was driving from Salt Lake City and that he had drifted between the lanes 
1 The pleadings section of the record is in reverse order. 
2 At trial, the State entered into evidence as State's Exhibit 4 (SE4) the 
audio/video recording from Officer Sager's dash camera. That recording is 
electronically attached in Addendum A. To view the recording, first open 
the file titled "Player"; then click on "open file"; and then click on 
"19h33m20s[0].dav. The recording is cited herein as SE4 followed by the 
relevant military time displayed on the recording, e.g., SE4:19:35. Because 
the video of the recording was obstructed after the 19:49, citation to the 
recording thereafter reflects only the audio. 
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of traffic because he was confused. SE4:19:42-19:43. Officer Sager asked 
Defendant for three documents: his license, his insurance card, and his 
registration. R276:126. Over the course of several minutes, Defendant could 
produce only his license and insurance card. R276-127; SE:19:35-19:38. 
During that interaction, Officer Sager noticed that Defendant showed 
signs of drug impairment- Defendant's pupils' were constricted, his voice 
was raspy, his hands were shaky, his face was loose and relaxed, and he 
had a hard tin1e taking his license out of his wallet. R276:126; SE:19:43. 
Suspecting that Defendant was under the influence of drugs, Officer Sager 
returned to his patrol car and called for both "an alcohol car" and a canine 
unit. SE4:19:39-42; see also R276:103 (explaining that canine units are not 
used for every traffic stop just to "run the dog around" the car and "see 
what it does"). It was about 7:41 p.n1. when Officer Sager made the request 
and within a minute, dispatch relayed that the canine unit may take "10-15" 
minutes to arrive. SE4:19:41-42. Officer Sager responded that the time was 
not a problem because Defendant needed to perform field sobriety tests. 
SE4:19:41-42. 
At approximately 7:42 p.m., Officer Peterson, who was "working a 
special enforcement shift for impaired drivers," arrived at the scene. 
R276:80-81; SE:19:42. Officer Sager im1nediately told Officer Peterson the 
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reason for the stop, that he believed the Defendant had recently used drugs, 
and that Defendant's passenger had a gang alert. SE4:19:42-44. 
Officer Peterson spoke with Defendant for about three minutes while 
Officer Sager looked in the computer system for Defendant's registration 
information. SE4:19:44-19:47. Officer Peterson immediately noticed that 
Defendant's "behavior was abnormal" -he was "very nervous," he was 
"looking around," and he was "very distracted." R276:82. Officer Peterson 
also noticed, as Officer Sager had, that Defendant's voice was "very raspy," 
his pupils were "very consh·icted," and his eyes did not react when Officer 
Peterson shined his flashlight in the car. R276:82-83. Officer Peterson 
thought Defendant's pupils' lack of reaction to "the dark or the light" was 
"odd," "especially at nighttime." R276:83. 
As Officer Peterson was finishing his initial interview with 
Defendant, two motorists who ran out of gas approached asking for help. 
SE4:19:47. Both officers stopped investigating to assist the motorists. Id. The 
officers interaction with the motorist took 1-2 minutes. SE4:19:47-48. 
At 7:47 p.m., Officer Peterson conferred with Officer Sager about 
Defendant's overall presentation. SE4:19:47. When both officers agreed that 
Defendant presented as someone who had recently used either narcotics or 
a II speed ball," Officer Peterson decided to perform field sobriety tests on 
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Defendant. R276:83; SE4:19:47. Officer Sager then moved his patrol car 
behind Officer Peterson's patrol car so that Officer Peterson could capture 
the field sobriety tests on his dash camera. 3 R276:175; SE4:19:48-19:49. 
At 7:50 p.m., the officers told Defendant why they believed field 
sobriety tests were necessary. SE4:19:19:50. Defendant tried to explain his 
behavior, telling the officers that he is not ordinarily nervous, but that his 
wife was having some health problems that were worrying him. SE4:19:50. 
Officer Peterson then began administering the tests: the nine-step walk and 
turn, the one leg stand, and the horizontal gaze nystagmus. See SE4:20:01-03 
(the tests are not visible on the video, but the video's audio records Officer 
Peterson reviewing the results of the three tests with Officer Sager after the 
tests were completed). 
At about 7:52 p.m. -17 1ninutes after the initial stop- the canine unit 
arrived. R276:98; SE4:19:52. The canine handler checked in with Officer 
Sager and was briefed about the situation. R276:99; SE4:19:53-54. The 
passenger was asked to step out of Defendant's car so that the canine sniff 
could occur. SE4:19:55-19:56. 
3 Because Officer Sager moved his patrol car, his dash camera's view 
became obstructed. SE4:19:48-19:49. After this point in the investigation, the 
dash camera recorded only the back of the patrol car, some peripheral 
movements, and the audio from Officer Sager's microphone. SE4:19:49. 
Officer Peterson's dash camera recording was not offered at trial. 
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At approximately 7:58 p.m., as Officer Peterson continued 
administering the field sobriety tests, the dog-a "big slobbery," seven-
year-old German shepherd-sniffed Defendant's car. R276:99-102, 128; 
SE4:19:58:20:00. The canine sniff took approximately two minutes. 
SE4:19:58-20:00. During the sniff, the dog alerted on the passenger and the 
driver side doors. R276:101-102. 
At about 8:01 p.m., Officer Peterson finished administering the field 
sobriety tests. SE4:20:01. After reviewing the results, Officer Sager decided 
to administer one 1nore test. SE4:20:04-20:06. Officer Sager and Officer 
Peterson then explained to Defendant the results of the tests and why they 
believed that he had taken opiates. SE4:20:06-20:07. 
The officers then searched Defendant's car based on the dog's 
positive alert. SE4:20:12; R276:100-102, 128. The search of Defendant's car 
yielded one baggie of heroin, three prescription bottles, a driver's license 
belonging to Nicole Uhlig, blank checks belonging to James A. Allen, and a 
hatchet underneath the driver seat. R276:129-145, 181; SE 33, 34. The search 
also yielded drug paraphernalia: a digital scale with residue, a Dori to' s can 
with a hidden compartment and a syringe inside, a red card with residue, a 
red bandana with a plastic tube, and a toolbox containing packing baggies 
with a spider emblem, spoons, several baggies of used and unused syringes, 
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a prescription bottle with a sh·aw inside, and two glass pipes with residue. 
R276:129-145. 
Defendant was arrested for DUI and possession of a controlled 
substance. R276:83. After waiving his Miranda rights, Defendant told Officer 
Peterson that he "shouldn't have done that," because he "was almost done 
with this stuff." R276:88. During his interview with Defendant, Officer 
Peterson saw track marks on Defendant's arms. R276:89. A search of 
Defendant incident to arrest revealed two containers of methamphetamine, 
weighing a total of 648 milligran1s. R276:153-158,181; SE 33, 34. 
B. Summary of proceedings. 
Defendant was charged with (1) possession of methamphetamine in a 
drug-free zone, a second degree felony; (2) possession of heroin in a drug-
free zone, a second degree felony; (3) possession of drug paraphernalia in a 
drug free zone, a class A misdemeanor; ( 4) possession of a dangerous 
weapon by a restricted person, a class A misdemeanor; and (5) unlawful 
possession of another's identification documents, a A misdemeanor. R161-
162.4 
4 Defendant was initially charged with driving under the influence of 
alcohol or drugs, but the State dismissed that charge and filed an amended 
information charging the drug offenses. R2; R161-162. 
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At the jury trial, the State played part of Officer Sager' s dash-camera 
recording from just before the stop until just after the canine unit arrived. 
SE4; R276:124-127. Officer Peterson's dash camera recording was not 
presented to the jury. Through cross-examination, defendant's counsel 
challenged the State's evidence as lacking, pointing out that the video did 
not show either the canine sniff or the search, but only "flashing lights." 
R276175-176; 277:15,16-17. Counsel also presented a defense that the 
contraband in the car was not Defendant's. R276:161-175; 277:20-21. 
The jury found Defendant guilty of possessing methamphetamine in 
a drug free zone, possessing drug paraphernalia in a drug free zone, and 
possessing a dangerous weapon by a resh·icted person. R277:31-32; R216-
220. The jury acquitted Defendant of the remaining counts. R216-220; 
R277:32. 
Defendant timely appealed. R256. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendant claims that his trial counsel was ineffective for not moving 
to suppress the contraband found in the car, arguing that his Fourth 
Amendment rights were violated by the delay occasioned by waiting for the 
canine unit to arrive. 
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Defendant's claim fails because he has not established in the first 
instance a meritorious Fourth Amendment claim. His Fourth Amendment 
challenge fails for two reasons: (1) the record does not support that the 
officers prolonged their investigation to await the arrival of the drug dog; 
and (2) any delay to conduct a dog sniff was justified in any event because 
the officers had reasonable suspicion that Defendant was using drugs. 
ARGUMENT 
DEFENDANT HAS NOT PROVEN THAT TRIAL COUNSEL WAS 
INEFFECTIVE FOR NOT FILING A SUPPRESSION MOTION 
Defendant argues that Officers Sager and Peterson violated his Fourth 
Amendment rights by prolonging the traffic stop and DUI investigation to 
allow the canine unit to arrive. Br. Aplt. 6. Because Defendant did not raise 
this issue below, he argues that his counsel was ineffective for not moving 
to suppress the evidence seized from the car. Br. Aplt. 7. Defendant has not 
met the heavy burden of proving ineffective assistance of counsel. 
*** 
"To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, [a defendant] 1nust 
meet the heavy burden of showing that (1) h·ial counsel rendered deficient 
performance which fell below an objective standard of reasonable 
professional judgment, and (2) counsel's deficient performance prejudiced 
him." State v. Chacon, 962 P.2d 48, 50 (Utah 1998) (citing State v. Arguelles, 
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921 P.2d 439, 441 (Utah 1996); Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 
(1984)). And where, as here, "the principle allegation of ineffectiveness" is 
"defense counsel's failure to litigate a Fourth Amendment claim 
competently," the defendant has the added burden of "prov[ing] that his 
Fourth Amendment claim is meritorious and that there is a reasonable 
probability that the verdict would have been different absent the excludable 
evidence in order to demonstrate prejudice." Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 
U.S. 365, 375 (1986). Defendant has not made that showing. 
In evaluating the reasonableness of a stop, a dual inquiry applies: (1) 
whether the stop was "lawful at its inception," and (2) whether the stop was 
"otherwise executed in a reasonable manner." Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 
405, 408 (2005); accord State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127, 1131-1132 (Utah 1994) 
(same). Defendant" does not dispute that the traffic stop was justified at its 
inception" based on the observed traffic violation. Br. Aplt. 9. "Nor does 
[he] dispute that the police officers formed new reasonable suspicion that 
[he] was driving impaired when they observed [his] consh·icted pupils, 
raspy voice, and shaky hands." Br. Aplt. 10. Defendant argues only that the 
officers unnecessarily prolonged their DUI investigation to await the arrival 
of the canine unit. Br. Aplt. 10. 
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Defendant's Fourth Amendment claim fails for two reasons. First, 
defendant has not shown that the officers delayed their DUI investigation 
until the dog arrived. And second, a delay for the drug dog to arrive would 
not, in any event, violate the Fourth Amendment because the officers had a 
reasonable, articulable suspicion that Defendant was engaged in drug-
related criminal activity. 
A. The record refutes Defendant's claim that the officers delayed 
their DUI investigation for the arrival and employment of the 
drug-detection dog. 
It is well established that a" detention [incident to a traffic stop] 'must 
be temporary and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose 
of the stop."' Lopez, 873 P.2d at 1131 (quoting Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 
500 (1983)). However, both the United States Supreme Court and the Utah 
Supreme Court have expressly rejected a "rigid time lhnitation" for an 
investigative detention, emphasizing "the need to consider the law 
enforcement purposes to be served by the stop as well as the time 
reasonably needed to effectuate those purposes." Sharpe, 470 at 685 (20-
minute investigation not prolonged where officers legitimately 
investigating); State v. Baker, 2010 UT 18, if17, 229 P.3d 650 ("no bright-line 
test" to assess appropriate length for a traffic-stop). 
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A court therefore "should not micromanage the details of a traffic 
stop to ensure that no actions of the police improperly extend the stop so 
long as the duration of the stop is reasonable under the totality of the 
circumstances." Baker, 2010 UT 18, 117. Rather, to determine whether a stop 
is prolonged, a court should II exan1ine whether the police diligently 
pursued a means of investigation that was likely to confirm or dispel their 
suspicions quickly, during which time it was necessary to detain the 
defendant." Sharpe, 470 U.S. at 686. 
Thus, a traffic stop is not prolonged by an officer detaining an 
offending motorist while completing a number of routine but somewhat 
time-consuming tasks related to the h·affic violation, such as c01nputerized 
checks of the vehicle's registration and the driver's license and criminal 
history, and the writing up of a citation or warning. Rodriguez v. United 
States, 135 S.Ct. 1609, 1615 (2015); Lopez, 873 P.2d at 1132. Nor does an 
officer's inquiries II convert the encounter into something other than a lawful 
seizure, so long as those inquiries do not measurably extend the stop." 
Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 333 (2009). 
Thus, a stop is unconstitutionally prolonged only if officers do not 
irwestigate their reasonable suspicions diligently. See e.g., United States v. 
Place, 462 U.S. 696, 709 (1983) (90-minute detention of defendant's luggage 
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at airport excessive in part because officer did not diligently investigate); 
Layton City v. Oliver, 2006 UT App 244, ~18, 139 P.3d 281 (three-and-one-
half hour traffic stop for faulty brake light excessive where officers did not 
diligently investigate and could have investigated without defendant's 
presence). 
A traffic stop is not prolonged, then, by a suspicionless canine sniff so 
long as the detention is no longer than "the time reasonably required to 
complete [the stop]." Caballes, 543 U.S. at 407; Rodriguez, 135 S.Ct. at 1614-
1615 (canine sniff is violation when sniff occurs after justification for stop is 
completed); accord Baker, 2010 UT 18, if 14; see e.g., United States v. Mendoza, 
468 F.3d 1256, 1261(10th Cir. 2006) (40-minute detention reasonable where 
officer diligent in promptly calling canine unit and canine unit arrived 
shortly after); State v. Wilkinson, 2008 UT App 395, ~,17-8, 197 P.3d 96 (traffic 
stop not prolonged by officer requesting canine unit). 
Here, the traffic stop was not prolonged to allow for the arrival of the 
canine unit. First, the canine sniff was completed within 25 minutes of the 
stop, SE4:19:35,19:58-20:00-a range of time that courts have repeatedly 
found to be reasonable for this kind of stop. See, e.g., State v. Morris, 2011 
UT 40, ,I30, 259 P.3d 116 (officer's 20-minute DUI investigation reasonable 
in duration and scope); State v. Hogue, 2007 UT App 86, if3, 157 P.3d 826. 
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(15-20 minute DUI investigation not unreasonable); State v. Ottesen, 920 P.2d 
183, 185-86 (Utah Court App 1996) ( defendant not unreasonably detained 
where, within 15 minutes, officer checked occupants' identifications, 
checked vehicle registration, ran warrants check, and called for DUI officer, 
who arrived within 5-10 minutes, all before field sobriety administered); 
Bullock v. Texas, 426 S.W.3d 226, 232 (Tex. Ct. App. 2012) (thirty-five 
minutes not unreasonable amount of time to spend questioning defendant 
and administrating six field sobriety tests); Appling v. Georgia, 320 Ga.App. 
379, 380, 739 S.E.2d 816 (Ga. Ct. App. 2013) (30 minutes elapsed before DUI 
officer arrived and started administering field sobriety tests); Belcher v. 
Texas, 244 S.W.3d 531, 540, 541-542 (Tex. Ct. App. 2007) (questioning 
defendant for 12 minutes then waiting 27 minutes for DUI officer to arrive 
not unreasonable). 
Second, the record confirms that the officers did nothing to prolong 
the stop here. They did not wait 12 minutes to investigate the DUI, as 
claimed by Defendant on appeal. Br. Aplt. 13. 
The initial stop for the h·affic violation occurred at 7:35 p.m. R276:125; 
SE:19:35. Within the next six minutes, Officer Sager "quickly" began 
investigating that violation by approaching Defendant, eliciting an 
explanation for his driving pattern, and collecting his driver's license and 
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proof of insurance- Defendant was unable to produce registration. 
R276:126-127, 161. And during this time, as even Defendant concedes, Br. 
Aplt. 10, Officer Sager developed new reasonable suspicion that Defendant 
was driving under the influence of drugs. R276:126; SE:19:35-19:38. 
At 7:41 p.m., Officer Sager asked for assistance from the assigned DUI 
unit and a canine unit. SE4:19:41. See Cabellas, 543 U.S. at 409 (stop not 
unconstitutionally unreasonable merely because officer requested a canine 
unit for a canine sniff while completing a traffic stop). Officer Peterson, the 
assigned DUI officer, arrived at 7:42 p.m., and he and Officer Sager 
diligently proceeded with their DUI investigation. R276:82-83; SE4:19:42-
20:09. First, Officer Sager briefed Officer Peterson on his observations up to 
that point. SE4:19:42-44. Then, at 7:44 p.m. - while Officer Sager conducted a 
computer check for the Buick's registration-Officer Peterson spoke with 
Defendant to assess whether he was impaired. SE4:19:44. At 7:47 p.m., two 
motorists who had run out of gas sought assistance from the officers and the 
officers left for a minute or two to provide that assistance. SE4:19:47-48. 
After quickly helping the stranded motorists, the two officers 
conferred with each other and decided to administer field sobriety tests. 
SE4:19:47. Officer Peterson began ad1ninistering a series of three field 
sobriety tests at approximately 7:50 p.1n., and he completed those tests at 
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8:01 p.m. SE4:19:50-20:01. It was during that 11-minute period-when 
Officer Peterson was administering the field sobriety tests-that the canine 
unit arrived and the drug dog was employed around the Buick. 
The canine unit arrived at 7:52 p.m. SE4:19:52; R276:98. The canine 
officer was then briefed by Officer Sager and the front seat passenger was 
directed to exit the vehicle. SE4:19:53-56; R276:99, 128. At 7:58 p.m., the drug 
dog was employed around the Buick, and by 8:00 p.m., it had alerted on the 
passenger side door-about one minute before the three field sobriety tests 
had been completed. SE4:19:58-20:00; R276:100-102. And the DUI 
investigation was still in progress. Officer Sager administered a fourth field 
sobriety test, which was completed at 8:06 p.m. - six minutes after the drug 
dog alert. SE4:20:04-06. 
No record evidence therefore supports that the officers delayed the 
investigation for the arrival and employment of the drug dog. Indeed, the 
record shows the opposite. The officers' investigation was diligent, 
n1ethodical, and followed standard protocol. See The National Highway 
Traffic Safety Administration, U.S. Dept. of Transportation, The Visual 
Detection of DWI in Motorists, Report No. DOT HS 808 677 (2010), 
http://www.nhtsa.gov/staticfiles/nti/pdf/ 808677.pdf (DUI h·aining guide 
explaining proper protocol); see e.g., State v. Simons, 2013 UT 3, if if 4-7, 296 
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P.3d 721 (deputies stopped car, talked to driver and passenger, conferred 
with one another, and investigated driver); State v. Levin, 2007 UT App 65, 
,17, 156 P.3d 178 (90-minute traffic stop reasonable considering that 
deputy performed field sobriety tests, drug recognition tests, questioned 
two other suspects, prepared citations, and, after allowing suspects to leave, 
stopped the car a second time); Sharpe, 470 U.S. at 685 (no rigid time 
limitation for an investigative detention). 
In asserting otherwise, Defendant contends that the officers 
unnecessarily delayed their DUI investigation by "moving a car" and 
"walking on the sidewalk" for two 1ninutes. Br. Aplt. 11-12. But the record 
refutes this claim. First, Officer Sager moved his pah~o1 car so that Officer 
Peterson, the assigned DUI officer, could capture the field sobriety tests on 
his dash camera. R276:175. Second, although Officer Sager's video does 
show an officer walking on the sidewalk for two minutes, the video's audio 
shows that as he walked on the sidewalk, the officer was explaining to 
Defendant why field sobriety tests were necessary-a precursor to 
administering field sobriety tests. SE4:19:50-19:52. 
Lastly, Defendant argues in a footnote that the administration of the 
field sobriety tests was prolonged. Br. Aplt. 11, n.6. But Defendant has not 
included Officer Peterson's dash cainera video of the field sobriety tests in 
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the record on appeal. See State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76, ~17, 12 P.3d 92 
(defendant's burden to ensure record adequate and request 23B remand if 
necessary to provide adequate record). Thus, the only record evidence of 
the field sobriety tests is the officers' testimony, the audio discussion caught 
on Officer Sager's video about the results of the tests, and the audio of 
Officer Sager administering an additional test after Officer Peterson had 
completed his tests. S£4:20:02-20:09. And this evidence shows only that the 
officers were thorough and diligent in their DUI investigation. SE4:20:00-
20:09. Thus, on this record, Defendant cannot support his claim that the 
tests were ad1ninistered in a prolonged manner or prolonged the stop. See 
Litherland, 2000 UT 76, ,I17 (where "the record appears inadequate in any 
fashion, ambiguities or deficiencies resulting therefrom simply will be 
consh·ued in favor of finding that counsel performed effectively"). 
Because Defendant cannot show on this record that the stop was 
prolonged in violation of the Fourth Amendment, he cannot show that a 
suppression motion on this ground would have been meritorious. For this 
reason alone, Defendant cannot show that his counsel was ineffective for 
not filing a suppression motion. See State v. Chacon, 962 P.2d 48, 51 (Utah 
1998) ("Neither speculative clai1ns nor counsel's failure to make futile 
objections establishes ineffective assistance of counsel."). 
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B. A delay for the arrival and employment of the drug-detection 
dog would have been justified in any event because the 
officers had reasonable suspicion that Defendant was 
engaged in drug-related criminal activity. 
Even had the record supported Defendant's claim of delay for the 
arrival and employment of the drug-detection dog, a Fourth Amendment 
challenge would have failed because the officers' reasonable suspicion of 
drug impairment justified extending the detention to determine whether 
drugs were in the car. 
First, as Defendant himself concedes, Br. Aplt. 8, the length of a traffic 
stop can be properly extended to investigate criminal activity for which 
reasonable suspicion arises during the lawful duration of a stop. Simons, 
2013 UT 3, if17; Baker, 2010 UT 18, ,I13. Defendant argues that because 
reasonable suspicion of drug possession or distribution was lacking, a 
canine sniff was not justified. Br. Aplt. 15-16. But Defendant concedes that 
the officers here had reasonable suspicion that he was driving while 
ilnpaired on drugs. Br. Aplt. 10, 15. This also justified the officers in 
prolonging the stop to employ a canine sniff- it was reasonable to believe 
that the drugs Defendant was using may be in the car. See State v. Wiegand, 
645 N.W.2d 125, 137 (Minn. 2002) (recognizing that drug-dog sniff around 
exterior of car justified where officer has reasonable suspicion that driver is 
under the influence of drugs). 
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Second, the search of the Buick- apart from any facts learned from 
the canine sniff-was justified as a search incident to arrest under Arizona v. 
Gant, 556 U.S. 332 (2009). Gant held that the search of a vehicle incident to 
an occupant's arrest is justified "when it is 'reasonable to believe evidence 
relevant to the crime of arrest might be found in the vehicle.'" 556 U.S. at 
343 (quoting Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615, 632 (2004) (Scalia, J., 
concurring in judgment)). In such circumstances, "the offense of arrest will 
supply a basis for searching the passenger compartment of an arrestee's 
vehicle and any containers therein." Id. at 344. 5 Defendant's arrest for 
driving while drug-impaired supplied the basis for searching the Buick for 
drugs. See People v. Nottoli, 199 Cal.App.4th 531, 553; 130 Cal. Rptr. 3d 884 
(2011) (holding that driver's DUI arrest "supplied a reasonable basis for 
believing that evidence 'relevant' to that type of offense might be in his 
vehicle"); State v. Cantrell, 233 P.3d 178, 185 (Idaho App. 2010) (holding that 
"the DUI supplied the basis for the search" because "[i]t was reasonable to 
believe that evidence of the offense, e.g., alcohol containers or other 
evidence of alcohol use, 'might be found in the vehicle'"); but see United 
5 Gant identifies another circumstance, not at issue here, that justifies 
the search of a vehicle incident to arrest: "when the arrestee is unsecure and 
within reaching distance of the passenger cmnpartment at the time of the 
search." 556 U.S. at 343. 
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States v. Taylor, 49 A.3d 818, 824-26 (D.C. 2012) (holding that search of 
vehicle incident to DUI arrest requires additional facts suggesting driver 
"had been drinking in his vehicle"). Although the search in this case may 
have taken place before Defendant's arrest, counsel for Defendant may have 
known that the officers would have searched the Buick pursuant to Gant 
and thus concluded that it would come in under the inevitable discovery 
doctrine. See LafferhJ v. State, 2007 UT 73, ~26, 175 P.3d 530 (presume that 
counsel acted reasonably absent evidence to the contrary); Litherland, 2000 
UT 76, ,I16 (defendant bears the burden of assuring record is adequate); see 
also State v. Gerber, 2015 UT App 76, iJ18, 347 P.3d 852 (Voros, J. (concurring 
in part)("strong presumption" that counsel made reasonable investigations). 
The State acknowledges that Utah courts have not addressed the 
specific issue as to whether reasonable suspicion of drug hnpairment 
justifies further delay to conduct a canine sniff or whether a DUI arrest 
alone is sufficient to justify the search of the vehicle incident to arrest. But 
this case must be viewed through the lens of ineffective assistance of 
counsel. And as such, the law is settled that h·ial counsel cannot be found 
deficient in foregoing a motion to suppress evidence on a theory that case 
law rejects. Chacon, 962 P.2d at 51. 
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In sum, Defendant has failed to "prove that his Fourth Amendment 
claim is meritorious and that there is a reasonable probability that the 
verdict would have been different absent the excludable evidence in order 
to demonstrate prejudice." Kimmelman, 477 U.S. at 375. Consequently, 
Defendant has also failed to prove that his trial counsel's decision to fore go 
a motion to suppress fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. 
Trial counsel reasonably deduced that any 1notion to suppress would have 
been futile. See Chacon, 962 P.2d at 51 ("Neither speculative claims nor 
counsel's failure to 1nake futile objections establishes ineffective assistance 
of counsel."). 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm. 
Respectfully submitted on April 20, 2016 . 
SEAN D. REYES 
Utah Attorney General 
~~ 
LlNDSEYWHEELER 
Assistant Solicitor General 
Counsel for A ppe llee 
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